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Natalie Minev 
August 25, 2008 
Final Research Paper 
The Chilean and South African Truth Commissions: a Comparative Assessment of 
their Truth-Seeking Processes and their Key Recommendations 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
  Truth commissions emerged onto the international scene during the 1990s 
as part of the Third Wave of democratization, particularly in Latin America and 
South Africa.  These temporary bodies vested with official authority to investigate 
and report on past periods of gross human rights violations have been 
experimented with as transitional justice mechanisms by over two dozen 
countries since the late 1980s.  However, it is still difficult to clearly define what 
makes a truth commission successful in its goals of seeking the truth of the past 
and creating greater social reconciliation.  By examining the truth commissions 
of Chile and South Africa, two countries whose truth commissions were among 
the largest and most groundbreaking at the time of their democratic transitions, 
this paper seeks to develop a better understanding of the factors and 
conditions that enable truth commissions to achieve their goals.   
The first and second sections of this paper will lay a broad groundwork on 
the background of truth commissions and clarify the parameters of this project.  
The third section will focus on Chile, first examining the context in which the 
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commission formed, followed by a four-stage assessment of the truth 
commission’s work and an examination of key recommendations in the areas of 
reparations, the rule of law, and human rights.  The fourth section will treat the 
South African experience in the same manner.  The paper will conclude with a 
discussion of insights gained by comparing the Chilean and South African truth 
commissions as well as suggest questions for future research in the area.   
 
II. GENERAL BACKGROUND ON TRUTH COMMISSIONS 
 
A. Definition of Truth Commissions 
Truth commissions are official bodies established to investigate a country’s 
past period of human rights abuses or violations of international humanitarian 
law.  Usually created at a point of political transition, they complete their work 
with the submission of a final report containing conclusions and 
recommendations.1  Priscilla Hayner’s classic definition puts forth four criteria that 
characterize truth commissions.  First, truth commissions focus on the past.  
Second, truth commissions do not focus on a specific event of abuse, but rather 
attempt to paint a broader picture of long-term patterns of human rights 
violations.  Third, truth commissions usually exist for a temporary and/or pre-
defined amount of time to collect their findings, and the body dissolves after 
submitting its report.  Lastly, truth commissions are vested with authority (either 
                                                 
1 Quinn and Freeman (2003).  “Lessons Learned: Practical Lessons Gleaned from the Inside the 
Truth Commissions of Guatemala and South Africa.”  Human Rights Quarterly.  1119. 
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by the nation’s government or by international actors) that may give the truth 
commission greater access to information, provide it with greater security, and 
allow it to have greater impact in delivering its report.2   
Emily Rodio expanded our understanding of truth commissions by noting 
that there are two subtypes of truth commissions.  The first subtype includes 
those accompanied by an amnesty provision, wherein perpetrators may be 
granted amnesty for their crimes in return for participation and full disclosure in 
the truth commission’s truth-seeking process.  The second subtype includes those 
truth commissions which are not accompanied by an amnesty provision, 
thereby allowing for potential prosecution of perpetrators at a later date.3  
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was the first truth 
commission ever to employ an amnesty provision in its work.  Conversely, the 
Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation did not have the legal 
authority to grant amnesty, though an existing amnesty law put in place by the 
former military regime effectively protected perpetrators from prosecution at 
that time.  
 
B. Purposes of Truth Commissions 
 At the end of the 20th century, countries undergoing political transitions 
began to use truth commissions to address systematic human rights violations 
                                                 
2 Hayner (1994).  “Fifteen Truth Commissions—1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study.”  Human 
Rights Quarterly.  604. 
3 Rodio (2007).  “Settling Past Accounts: Assessing the Impact of Truth Commissions on 
Democratization.”  Paper presented at International Studies Association, 2007.  4-5. 
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carried out either by a former abusive regime, opposition forces, or both.  As of 
2008, over two dozen countries have established truth commissions as 
transitional mechanisms.  Elin Skaar notes in her work that truth commissions, 
bodies that stop short of prosecuting perpetrators, generally emerge out of 
political compromise between a strong outgoing regime and strong public 
demand for accountability.4  Truth commissions are assumed to serve manifold 
purposes for countries in transition.5  First, they are established with the goal of 
clarifying and acknowledging the truth about past human rights violations that 
occurred in the country, thereby establishing a clearer, more accurate historical 
record that may shed light on painful events that have been hidden, denied, or 
disputed between different sectors of society.   Second, truth commissions are 
inherently concerned with victims and focus on their needs and interests.  This 
may involve ensuring a safe and supportive environment for victims to tell their 
stories, suggesting reparations for victims and their families, and aiding in the 
investigation of victims’ whereabouts and ultimate fate.  Third, truth 
commissions, although they are not judicial bodies, can contribute to justice 
and accountability by forwarding the evidence they compile to the country’s 
courts.  Individual truth commissions have the ability to determine whether or not 
they will disclose the names of perpetrators, a decision which has important 
implications in bringing these individuals to justice.  Even if truth commissions 
                                                 
4 Skaar (1999).  “Truth commissions, trials—or nothing? Policy options in democratic transitions.”  
Third World Quarterly.  1109.  
5 Hayner (2001). Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity.  
5 | P a g e  
 
choose not to name individual perpetrators, they may still identify those 
institutions or groups responsible for human rights violations and hold those 
groups publicly accountable.  Fourth, truth commissions outline institutional 
responsibility for crimes and make recommendations to reform institutional 
structures and laws that enabled abuses to occur.  With the goal of preventing 
future human rights abuses, these recommendations are presented to the new 
transitional government for implementation.  Finally, truth commissions attempt 
to promote reconciliation and reduce tensions that result from past violence.  
This goal is based on the assumption that if both victims and perpetrators come 
forward to tell their stories and acknowledge events of the past, those groups 
may be able to more peacefully coexist with each other in society.   
 Ideally, the work of truth commissions can positively affect multiple facets 
of a state.  For the families of victims, the truth-seeking process may offer a way 
to discover the whereabouts and fate of a loved one.  For perpetrators, it may 
present an opportunity to break with the past, to confess and reflect upon sins, 
and to reintegrate back into society.  For the new transitional government, the 
work of the truth commission may help to underscore to the nation as well as the 
international community a separation from a history of human rights violations 
and can also help obtain greater domestic political legitimacy.6  Finally, for the 
transitional society, a truth commission’s work can help to heal a nation in the 
aftermath of a traumatizing and oppressive regime.   
                                                 
6 Hayner (1994).  “Fifteen Truth Commissions—1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study.”  Human 
Rights Quarterly.  604. 
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C. Factors that May Impact the Efficacy of Truth Commissions 
 Multiple factors can significantly enhance or obstruct the work of a truth 
commission.  While some of these factors can be determined by the body that 
establishes the truth commission or by the truth commission itself, others remain 
outside of a commission’s control.  The following will highlight those factors that 
particularly impacted the work of the Chilean and South African truth 
commissions, but it is by no means an exhaustive list of factors that contribute to 
truth commission success or failure.   
 (1) Scope of mandate.  A truth commission’s mandate lays out the 
parameters of its investigation.  The mandate should clearly define the types of 
violations and time period that will be investigated.  Furthermore, abuses 
included in the mandate should be representative of the most egregious human 
rights violations that occurred during the period in consideration.  Too broad of 
a mandate may overwhelm a truth commission; an overly limited or 
unrepresentative mandate may undermine the legitimacy of the body as well 
as shortchange victims and their relatives.    
 (2) Length of duration.  Depending on how long a period of human rights 
violations a truth commission investigates, its length of duration to compile 
testimony, investigate, and deliver a report should last anywhere from nine 
months to two and a half years.7  Sufficient time is necessary to appoint 
                                                 
7 Hayner (2001). Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity. 221. 
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commissioners, to organize staff and methodology, and most important, to fully 
engage in the truth-seeking process.  An indefinite amount of time or an 
ambiguous deadline for achieving these objectives may cause the 
commission’s work to lose momentum as well as public support.8 
 (3) Legal powers.  Truth commissions can be vested with numerous legal 
powers that can aid them in their search for truth.  The power to subpoena 
witness testimony as well as documents from critical sectors of the government 
can help the truth commission create a clearer picture of past abuses and 
understand more clearly which parties were responsible.  Similarly, the power to 
grant amnesty to perpetrators in return for their participation and full disclosure 
of their involvement in past abuses is a powerful way to unearth new information 
and perhaps discover the whereabouts or cause of death of victims.  Without 
these critical legal powers, a truth commission may be left at the mercy of 
branches of government or perpetrators from the former state who may be 
unwilling to testify and whose uncooperative behavior may undermine the truth 
commission’s investigation. 
 (4) Identifying perpetrators by name.  A truth commission may choose 
whether or not to publicly name names of perpetrators it finds to be guilty of 
human rights violations.  Those who advocate naming names believe it 
contributes to accountability, justice, and furthers the possibility of reconciliation 
                                                 
8 Hayner (2001). Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity. 223.  The Uganda 
truth commission faced the dilemma of an undefined amount of time to complete its work—
investigations ended up dragging on intermittently and without coherence.  The commission did 
not compile or present a final report.   
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and forgiveness between victims and perpetrators.  Those truth commissions that 
choose not to name names may do so because accusing an individual of 
committing a crime without the opportunity to defend herself in a court of law 
violates due process and undermines the rule of law in the transitional state.  
Additionally, naming names of perpetrators in a volatile political environment in 
which the former regime is still powerful may ignite instability or reprisals.    
(5) Political climate.  The political dynamics of a transitional state can 
determine how much investigative authority a truth commission will have.   If the 
former regime accused of human rights violations still wields significant power in 
the country, the transitional government establishing the truth commission may 
conscientiously limit the body’s investigative powers, stop short of direct 
accusations or naming names, or attempt to spread responsibility equally 
among the former regime as well as opposition forces.  Such political 
concessions may be made to preserve stability or prevent old conflicts from 
inflaming.  However, these concessions may also obstruct justice, anger victims 
and their relatives, and keep hidden critical information needed in illuminating 
the country’s past.  If the former government does not wield significant power, 
there may be an environment in which political negotiation between two or 
more powerful parties in the nation takes place.  Negotiation especially among 
the former state and the new transitional government may enable a united 
vision for change and reconciliation for the future of the country, and may 
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encourage greater cooperation of all sides to contribute to the truth-seeking 
process.   
 
III. PARAMETERS OF THIS PROJECT 
 
Comparative analysis of country experiences with truth commissions, in 
this case South Africa and Chile, provides a framework for understanding the 
conditions which can affect the likelihood of success of a particular truth 
commission.    This paper’s comparison of the Chilean and South African 
experience with truth commissions will utilize the specific tasks set forth in each 
commission’s respective mandates to trace how successful each commission 
was at achieving its goals in four stages of the truth-seeking process I have 
developed.  In the first stage, the formation stage, the truth commission is 
established, its powers, mandate, and time limit are articulated, and other 
logistics such as staff and budgeting are put in place.  In the second stage, the 
investigation stage, the truth commission collects testimony from victims and/or 
relatives, obtains information from perpetrators or government agencies, and 
accumulates research from non-governmental organizations.  The third stage of 
the process is the report stage, wherein the truth commissioners compile their 
final report, which includes their findings and recommendations.  In the 
acknowledgement stage, the last stage of the process analyzed here, the 
public responds to the truth commission’s presentation of the report.  This stage is 
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of importance because the response of victims and their relatives to the report 
may signal whether the truth commission’s work was satisfactory or lacking in 
certain areas.  The behavior of the transitional government, the former regime, 
and opposition forces in response to the release of the report as well as the 
reforms it puts forward may also set the stage for how well the commission’s 
recommendations fare in the post-truth commission environment.  Through each 
of these four stages, I will examine how comprehensively the truth commission 
achieved its stated goals. 
 The second half of the analysis will look at key recommendations put 
forward by each truth commission and the extent to which the 
recommendations were implemented in the years after the commission 
dissolved.  Including a discussion about the implementation of 
recommendations after the conclusion of the commission’s work is important 
because there is  
a conspicuous lack of research on implementation of truth commission 
recommendations in the existing body of literature.9  I have chosen to examine 
three critical recommendations for each truth commission covering the areas of 
reparations, the rule of law, and human rights.  A brief synopsis of the original 
recommendation will be followed by evidence of whether the reform was 
implemented fully, partially, or not at all.   
                                                 
9 Hayner (2001). Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity. 168. 
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 The findings and analysis of this paper draw from several different sources.  
First, the primary documents of the Chilean and South African truth commission 
reports were utilized.  Second, existing literature in the social sciences on truth 
commissions contributed to this research paper.  Finally, Human Rights Watch 
and Amnesty International annual country reports on Chile and South Africa 
were used to trace the implementation of reforms suggested by the truth 
commissions.   
 
IV. CHILE 
 
A. Context of the Formation of the Chilean Truth Commission 
 In September 1973, General Augusto Ugarte Pinochet, head of the army, 
overthrew the civilian government led by leftist president Salvador Allende.  The 
coup d’état occurred in the midst of a tumultuous period of political 
polarization, popular violence, and skyrocketing inflation.  The military 
government established by Pinochet employed brutal anticommunism tactics, 
economic reform, and widespread repression of opposition or subversion.10  
Repressive and authoritarian tactics used included murder, indefinite 
detainment, kidnappings (“disappearances”), torture, and mass arrests.11   The 
military declared a state of siege that began the date of the coup and ended 
                                                 
10 Kirtz, ed. (1995).  Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes.  
Volume II: Country Studies.  453.   
11 Hayner (2001). Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity. 35. 
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on March 1978.  It was during this five-year period that the worst human rights 
violations took place: most of the approximately 3,000 extrajudicial executions, 
“disappearances,” and deaths under torture committed by state agents 
throughout the military government date from this period.12  Thousands more 
were detained and illegally tortured.13  In 1978, Pinochet instituted an amnesty 
law which prevented the prosecution of human rights violations that took place 
during the 1973-1978 period.    
 Numerous institutions participated and/or enabled human rights abuses to 
occur during Pinochet’s brutal regime. The Direción de Inteligencia Nacional 
(DINA) intelligence agency as well as its successor, the Central Nacional de 
Informaciones (CNI) led the effort in executing, capturing, detaining, exiling, 
and torturing thousands of civilians and suspected members of the opposition.14  
The judiciary, though still in place, did not challenge the regime’s official version 
of events or protect human rights, fostering an environment in which impunity 
reigned.15 
 Though Pinochet maintained the support of the political right in the 
country, he narrowly lost a plebiscite held in 1988, forcing him to step down and 
call elections the following year.  Patricio Aylwin, of the center-left Christian 
Democratic Party, was later officially elected president in March 1990.  The 
                                                 
12 Human Rights Watch Annual Report, Chile, 1999.   
13 Human Rights Watch Annual Report, Chile, 1999.   
14 Kirtz, ed. (1995).  Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes.  
Volume II: Country Studies.  453.   
15 The Report of the Chilean National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, chapter 2, part 4. 
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transition came after over a decade of mass protests against Pinochet’s regime.  
However, as the new transitional democratic government assumed power, 
countless political constraints remained as an overshadowing legacy of the 
former brutal regime.  In addition to the 1978 Amnesty Law, which was still in 
place, Pinochet had amended the Chilean constitution in 1980, ensuring that he 
remained commander-in-chief of the armed forces until 1998 and then a 
senator for life.  Additionally, the amended constitution gave Pinochet the right 
to appoint nine senators, thereby creating a right-wing opposition bloc in the 
Parliament that basically guaranteed obstacles to new reforms.16   
 
B. Assessment of the Chilean Truth Commission 
 
1. Formation stage 
 One month after being elected in April 1990, President Aylwin established 
the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation via presidential Supreme 
Decree No. 355.  The truth commission was both a response to great public 
demand for inquiry into the brutalities of Pinochet’s seventeen-year rule as well 
as part of a human rights platform that the new coalitional government 
committed itself to immediately after taking office.  Aylwin appointed eight 
commissioners who came from legal, human rights, or government professions 
(the commission was often dubbed the Rettig Commission after the head 
                                                 
16 Human Rights Watch Annual Report, Chile, 1990.   
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commissioner, lawyer and former senator Raúl Rettig).  The commissioners were 
also evenly distributed along the political spectrum, Aylwin’s way of 
communicating that the commission’s work would be done fairly and in good 
faith.17  The commission was granted a duration of six months with a possible 
three-month extension.  The time period to be investigated covered September 
11, 1973, the date of the military coup of Allende’s government, to March 11, 
1990, the date the new transitional government took office.   
 Critical choices made by President Aylwin during the National Commission 
for Truth and Reconciliation’s formation would significantly limit the commission’s 
investigation and its findings as well as impact the overall response to the 
commission’s work after it released its report.  First, the commission was decreed 
by the executive branch rather than by members of Parliament.  Arguably, this 
decision was made to ensure that the creation of the commission would not be 
halted by the right-wing opposition bloc in the Senate.  It was also a choice that 
would allow the transitional government to avoid inciting confrontation with 
members of the right and the military.18   However, because the truth 
commission was formed in a process that was almost solely conducted by the 
members of the new transitional government, there was silence as well as 
vehement refusal from the military to condone the commission’s work and goals, 
which prevented the commission from accessing critical information it needed 
                                                 
17 Kirtz, ed. (1995).  Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes.  
Volume II: Country Studies.  463.   
18 Ensalaco (2000).  Chile Under Pinochet: Recovering the Truth. 183. 
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to conduct investigations.  The presidential decree laid out the mandate for the 
commission to fulfill, which consisted of four tasks: 
(1) To establish as complete a picture as possible of those grave 
events, as well as their antecedents and circumstances, 
(2) To gather evidence that may make it possible to identify the 
victims by name and determine their fate or whereabouts, 
(3) To recommend such measures of reparation and 
reinstatement as it regards as just, 
(4) To recommend the legal and administrative measures which 
in its judgment should be adopted in order to prevent actions 
such as those mentioned in this article from being 
committed.19  
 
  A number of features during this stage of the commission’s existence 
seemed to predict a thorough investigation of the past.  The commission was 
provided with a staff of sixty members that included legal experts, interviewers, 
law students, and human rights workers who would be assigned to researching 
individual cases in-depth.  In addition, the commissioners, as noted above, 
included some of the most respected figures in law, government, and human 
rights activism who brought together diverse political perspectives with a united 
goal to reveal the truth, foster reconciliation and justice, and respond to victims’ 
needs.  
More significantly, however, some of the greatest limitations placed on 
the Chilean truth commission were solidified during this stage: namely, its limited 
length of operation, its limited definition of human rights violations in its 
mandate, the absence of critical legal powers, and its inability to identify 
perpetrators by name.  Though the mandate covered a time span of almost 
                                                 
19 Supreme Decree No. 355.  
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two decades, the decree proclaimed that the truth commission would have at 
most nine months to complete its work, which included organizing the institution, 
hiring staff, registering cases, interviewing victims’ relatives, conducting 
investigative research and coming to conclusions on cases, and finally, 
compiling a final report.   Hayner notes in her work that the general optimal time 
period for truth commissions to complete their work is one to two years, based 
on analysis of the work of other truth commissions.20  This time limit of less than 
one year presented the commission with an enormous case load, with legal 
teams taking on 200 cases each.21 
Because of the commission’s limited time of operation, the types of 
human rights violations to be investigated were also curtailed substantially.  The 
commission was mandated to investigate “disappearances after arrests, 
execution, and torture leading to death committed by government agents or 
people in their service, as well as kidnappings and attempts on the life of 
persons carried out by private citizens for political reasons.”22  These parameters 
failed to address the tens of thousands of Chileans who were tortured in 
situations that did not result in death, illegal detentions that did not result in 
death, or forced exiles.23 
In addition, since it was established by presidential decree and not 
congressional mandate, the commission did not possess subpoena powers and 
                                                 
20 Hayner (2001). Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity. 321. 
21 Ensalaco (2000).  Chile Under Pinochet: Recovering the Truth. 198. 
22 Supreme Decree No. 355.   
23 Hayner (2001). Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity. 303.   
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thus did not have the legal authority to compel testimony from witnesses. 24 Only 
authority vested by the Parliament could have established this legal authority for 
the commission.  The absence of this critical power considerably limited the 
commission in its objective to illustrating a complete picture of the period of 
abuses and discover new evidence, since it could not induce unwilling 
perpetrators to give their side of the story nor provide to the commission 
important evidentiary documents about past abuses.  Aylwin’s insistence that 
the truth commission was not a court of justice but rather an information-
gathering body additionally prevented it from having the power to identify by 
name the perpetrators it would find guilty of crimes, even though many of the 
names of these perpetrators were well-known in society.25  This limitation would 
seriously undermine the credibility and impact of the report upon its release.   
 
2. Investigation stage 
 The Chilean truth commission’s investigative work began in June 1990.  This 
included registering cases, determining which cases fell into the commission’s 
mandate, interviewing witnesses, cross-referencing information with 
governmental and nongovernmental agencies, contending with the armed 
forces and police, and transmitting new evidence to the courts.  By the time the 
commission began to operate, some 3,400 alleged cases of human rights 
                                                 
24 Kirtz, ed. (1995).  Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes.  
Volume II: Country Studies.  465.   
25 Ensalaco (2000).  Chile Under Pinochet: Recovering the Truth. 193. 
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violations involving death had been registered with the commission, a figure 
that reflected the enormity of abuses during Pinochet’s regime.   Still thousands 
upon thousands of other cases of torture and detention fell outside of the 
commission’s mandate and could not be examined.26  
The commission’s investigative work was aided greatly by charity and 
human rights groups in the country, including the Vicariate of Solidarity, which 
had filed 8,700 writs of habeas corpus between 1973 and 1988 as well as 
collected extensive archives on cases, and the Chilean Human Rights 
Commission, which had gathered thousands of case files since 1978. 27  Similarly, 
the process of interviewing family members of victims proved to be a valuable 
well of information as well as a deeply emotional, sometimes cathartic 
experience for both commission staff and relatives telling their stories.  These in-
depth, one-on-one interviews detailing cases of torture and violent 
interrogations, killings followed by disappearances, and deaths in war tribunals 
would constitute the flesh and blood of the commission’s final report.  The details 
of these findings were forwarded to the courts in hopes of future prosecutions.  
 However, those investigative limitations placed on the commission in its 
establishing decree would manifest many difficulties for the commission in its 
gathering of information.  Mark Ensalaco describes the obstacles placed before 
the commission with the absence of subpoena powers: 
                                                 
26 Hayner (1994).  “Fifteen Truth Commissions—1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study.”  Human 
Rights Quarterly.  621. 
27 Ensalaco (2000).  Chile Under Pinochet: Recovering the Truth. 197. 
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…by denying the commission the power to subpoena witnesses and 
documents [President Aylwin] made it difficult for the commission to 
perform 
even its more modest investigatory function. The commission was given 
the 
authority to gather evidence from voluntary witnesses, and to take 
measures 
to protect their identity.  The commission also had the authority to request 
reports and documents from  all governmental agencies and to gain 
access to 
any sites it deemed necessary to visit.  But the commission did not possess 
the 
legal authority to demand documents or access to important locations, 
much 
less to compel the testimony of unwilling witnesses.  Consequently, the 
documents turned over by the military and police were selective.28 
 
Indeed, there was very little cooperation from those institutions that participated 
in torture.  The Ministry of Justice, the Civil Registrar, and the Chilean police and 
armed forces responded to most of the commission’s requests for evidence by 
claiming that documents and other records of those killed and disappeared 
had been burned or destroyed.29 These last two institutions possessed the most 
critical information necessary for the commission to construct the truth of past 
events as well as to find out the whereabouts and fates of victims.  In addition, 
the military was almost entirely silent in participating in the interviewing process, 
even with the knowledge that the commission would not name names and that 
they were still covered by the 1978 Amnesty Law.  Only one active police and 
                                                 
28 Ensalaco (2000).  Chile Under Pinochet: Recovering the Truth. 196. 
29 While the navy and air force cooperated with the commission more than the others listed 
above, their participation also remained limited.  The Report of the Chilean National Commission 
for Truth and Reconciliation. Part 1, chapter 1.  
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one air force official indicated willingness to offer testimony to the commission.30 
Rettig was asked in a later interview why the commission never requested an 
interview with General Pinochet.  His answer was simply, “No. That, of course, 
would not have been possible.”31 His revealing statement gives insight into how 
fragile the political climate in Chile was at the time of the commission’s work 
and how this environment directly influenced the limited extent to which the 
truth of past crimes would be discovered in the commission’s investigation 
stage. 
 
3. Report stage 
 The breadth of the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation’s 
report was impressive by the existing standards for truth commissions at the time.  
In February 1991, its completed report consisted of over 2,000 pages.  The final 
report identified 2,279 victims that fit within its mandate and reported that 642 
cases were still unresolved.  The report articulated a comprehensive explanation 
of its methodology as well as a political and historical context into the turn of 
events beginning in 1973.  It then detailed in three designated time periods the 
types of human rights violations that occurred, which institutions were 
responsible, and how multiple sectors of Chilean society reacted to the ongoing 
abuses.  The report was particularly critical of the Chilean judiciary in its 
acquiescence to the military government and its lack of independence in 
                                                 
30 The Report of the Chilean National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation. Part 1, chapter 1. 
31 Ensalaco (2000).  Chile Under Pinochet: Recovering the Truth. 201. 
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failing to stand up for human rights.  Though it did not name the names of 
perpetrators, the commission reported that the vast majority of crimes were 
traceable to official forces: a combination of military and police intelligence 
units in the first year of military rule, and after that the security police composed 
of military and civilian agents.32  Furthermore, a substantial portion of the report 
was devoted to describing the suffering and anguish of those Chileans who lost 
their loved ones to atrocities carried out during Pinochet’s regime. 
 The commission in concluding the report put forward a significant number 
of institutional, legal, and reparative recommendations, including the 
establishment of a follow-up body to administer reparations and continue 
investigations into the 642 unresolved cases.  However, the report 
disappointingly stopped short of recommending that the 1978 Amnesty Law be 
annulled.  In the coming decade, this law would be utilized to close human 
rights cases in the courts and would come under fire by numerous international 
human rights agencies as being instrumental to permitting widespread impunity 
for past human rights violations. 
 Perhaps the greatest disappointment of the truth commission’s report was 
its lack of new information regarding the whereabouts and fates of thousands of 
other victims.  Because of legal obstacles in obtaining information, its limited 
time of operation, its limited mandate, and its overall cautionary approach to 
investigating the responsible parties for these crimes, the report reflects the 
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Chilean truth commission’s failure to fulfill its mandated goal of gathering 
evidence in a way that would allow the identification, whereabouts, and fates 
of victims.  This process would have to be left up to the courts, which now 
possessed the evidence gathered by the commission.33   
 
4.  Acknowledgment stage 
 The Rettig Commission’s report was presented to President Patricio Aylwin 
in March 1991, when he addressed the Chilean public on national television 
discussing the report’s findings, its recommendations, and his own reflections 
with tears in his eyes.  He also personally gave the report to representatives of 
victims’ organizations.34  In his address, Aylwin communicated his hopes that the 
crimes would be pursued in the courts with “justice to the extent possible” and 
said that the Amnesty Law of 1978 should not be an obstacle to investigating 
these cases35.  He additionally apologized on behalf of the government for the 
trauma and pain of all victims and pleaded that “the Armed Forces and forces 
of order, and all who have had participation in the excesses committed, [make] 
gestures of recognition of the pain caused and cooperate in diminishing it.”36  
While the emotion and sentiment of his speech strived for renewed 
reconciliation in Chilean society, the responses of both the former regime and 
the public were discouraging. 
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 The Supreme Court, all of whom were appointed personally by Pinochet 
during his presidency, called the report “impassioned, reckless, biased” in its 
May 13 response to the report.37  Both the National Security Council and the 
armed forces criticized the report as inaccurate and unjust.  On March 28, 1991 
Pinochet stated the armed forces’ “fundamental disagreement” with the report, 
calling its findings “personal and precarious convictions which have been 
transformed into condemnatory sentences against many persons, outside due 
process.”38  The armed forces’ lack of recognition of the report was 
disappointing and infuriating to many and reiterated the continued lack of 
accountability under the transitional government.    
 Human rights organizations and the public’s response to the truth 
commission’s report was divided at best.39  Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International in their 1991 annual reports on Chile both communicated 
reservations about the limitations of the commission’s work.  Additionally, several 
polls taken after the release of the commission’s report reveal an ambivalent 
and dissatisfied public.40  One poll revealed that 70% of respondents did not 
consider the report to be a definitive solution to the problem of human rights 
                                                 
37 Ensalaco (2000).  Chile Under Pinochet: Recovering the Truth. 221. 
38 Kirtz, ed. (1995).  Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes.  
Volume II: Country Studies.  476.   
39 Hayner inaccurately characterized the reception of the report as “wide reclaim” among both 
the public and the human rights community. Priscilla Hayner (1994).  “Fifteen Truth 
Commissions—1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study.”  Human Rights Quarterly.  622.   
40 Kirtz, ed. (1995).  Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes.  
Volume II: Country Studies.  474-475. 
24 | P a g e  
 
violations.41  Another poll asking whether the Rettig Report contributed to 
reconciliation revealed an even split: 42.5% answered yes, 39.5% answered no.42 
 Only a month after the release of the report, rightwing senator Jaime 
Guzmán was assassinated by the armed Left, in an event that Human Rights 
Watch said “effectively ended public discussion of the Rettig Report.”43 The 
legacy of Chile’s National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation would 
ultimately be left up to a legislature and court system deeply embedded with 
officials, practices, and obstacles left in place by the former regime. 
 
C. Key Recommendations of the Chilean Truth Commission 
 
1. Reparations: A follow-up state body should be created to continue 
the search for the remains of those killed and disappeared.  Fully implemented. 
 In one of its final recommendations in its report, the Chilean truth 
commission suggested the establishment of a public law foundation as a follow-
up body to investigate the remaining unresolved cases, to collect further 
evidence, to administer financial reparations to families, to elaborate on 
education proposals, and to centralize information gathered by the 
commission.44  This public law foundation, known as the National Corporation for 
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Reparation and Reconciliation, was created by Congress with the passage of 
Law No.19.123 on January 31, 1991.  It was established as a temporary state 
organ with a mandate lasting until 1997.  Chile’s was the first truth commission to 
successfully establish a follow-up body to carry out implementation of any of its 
recommendations.  Although the general goal of the body would be to carry 
out the recommendations of the National Commission for Truth Commission and 
Reconciliation, the Corporation would address three specific areas: to discover 
the whereabouts of those victims who disappeared; to investigate those 642 
cases that the commission did not resolve; and to administer financial 
reparations to the families of victims.   
 By 1997, the year the mandate of the Corporation expired, progress had 
been made in all three areas, though the body was expectedly overwhelmed 
with new cases and limited in time and resources.  As a result of its investigative 
efforts, the Corporation presented a report that confirmed another 899 cases in 
which human rights violations had occurred.45  Additionally, the Corporation’s 
work aided in exhuming and identifying bodies buried in mass graves, such as 
the clandestine graves in which remains of officials from Allende’s government 
were discovered in the Santiago Cemetery in 1995.46   
 The bulk of the Corporation’s work addressed the immediate need to 
administer financial aid to the families of victims as a necessary path to 
reconciliation in Chilean society.  By 1997, 4,886 Chileans received a check in 
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the mail each month from the government as part of the government’s lifetime 
pension plan for family members killed or disappeared under the military 
dictatorship.47  Immediate family members would be distributed a check each 
of month of $481; families with only one surviving member received a $345 
check per month.  Family members were also entitled to educational and 
healthcare benefits as well as a waiver of military service.  While these benefits 
covered only a fraction of the thousands of Chileans who suffered under the 
military dictatorship and excluded those victims and family members whose 
human rights violations did not fit into the commission’s mandate, the progress 
was nevertheless a positive step in the direction of implementing concrete 
measures to help relieve the pain and suffering of those most deeply impacted 
by the brutal regime.  
 
2. The Rule of Law:  Military courts should be used in limited circumstances 
and under the supervision of the Supreme Court.  Not implemented.   
 As noted previously, the Chilean truth commission was emphatically 
critical of the judiciary’s lack of independence, particularly its failure to provide 
oversight of military tribunals during Pinochet’s regime.  One of the key judicial 
reform recommendations put forth by the commission called for military courts 
to restrict their jurisdiction to cases solely involving crimes committed by the 
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military against other individuals in the military, and for the Supreme Court to 
more rigorously supervise the actions of these courts.48   
 However, this recommendation, though pushed as a part of a 
comprehensive package of reforms by the government in 1991, failed to come 
to fruition.  As a result, the Supreme Court almost always upheld military courts’ 
jurisdiction over human rights cases during the military dictatorship involving 
civilians, and most of the investigations into these critical cases were closed by 
the military courts either indiscriminately or on the basis of the 1978 Amnesty 
Law.   In addition, the military courts throughout the 1990s prosecuted and 
sentenced a multitude of journalists, human rights lawyers, and other civilians for 
“offending” the armed forces.49 
Not until 1997 did the Supreme Court begin asserting its authority over the 
military courts, when it rejected the Military Prosecutor General’s petition to 
instruct all appeal courts and judges to close hundreds of cases of human rights 
violations that occurred during the 1973 to 1978 military government.  It was the 
first time the Supreme Court had re-established its authority to decide on cases 
within their jurisdiction.50  In October 1998, the same month that Pinochet was 
arrested in London at the request of a Spanish judge on charges of gross human 
rights violations, the Supreme Court again rejected the Military Prosecutor 
General’s request and recommended that courts and judges speed up all 
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pending human rights violations cases.51  The Supreme Court, in perhaps its most 
courageous gesture of independence since the transition of the early 1990s, 
finally re-interpreted the 1978 Amnesty Law in July 1999, proclaiming that cases 
in which victims disappeared did not fall under the Amnesty Law unless their 
deaths had been established by evidence.52  However, to this day, the Supreme 
Court has not annulled the 1978 Amnesty Law.  
The failure of the Supreme Court in allowing military courts to control the 
jurisdiction of thousands of cases of human rights violations undoubtedly 
corroded the rule of law and victims’ perceptions of justice in the country during 
the political transition.  Unfortunately, as late as 2004, military courts in the 
country still held jurisdiction over some cases of human rights violations that had 
still not been transferred back to civilian courts.  
 
3. Human Rights:  There should be limitations in the use of solitary 
confinement, with access to an independent doctor and safeguards for the 
prisoner’s physical and mental health.  Not implemented. 
 The commission’s report placed noticeable importance on the use of 
solitary confinement in threatening the development of a strong human rights 
culture, noting that statistics provided by international organizations revealed 
that torture usually takes place during periods of solitary confinement.  The 
commission’s recommendation regarding solitary confinement suggested that 
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this practice be used only for limited time periods and under certain 
circumstances, such as preventing “suspects from engaging in collusion in order 
to impede investigation into the facts of the crime.”  The recommendation also 
advised that those under solitary confinement should have access to an 
independent doctor at all times for physical and mental healthcare.53 
 Tracing the path of this recommendation’s fate leads to a discouraging 
record of the use of solitary confinement by the government throughout the 
1990s.  Although legal reforms limiting incommunicado detention and providing 
for medical examination of detainees were enacted in February 1992, the same 
year, at least 20 complaints of torture related to solitary confinement were 
presented to the courts, and none of those responsible for torture were brought 
to justice.54  A particularly egregious case was recorded in 1993, when Chilean 
citizen Mirentchu Vivanco Figueroa was arrested without warrant, held 
incommunicado for three days, deprived of sleep, threatened with death, and 
forced to remain standing for long periods of time.55   
 Such cases were rarely questioned by the courts, with the exception of an 
unusual ruling by the Santiago Appeals Court in 1994, in which it found that 
eleven alleged armed opposition group members had been tortured, held 
incommunicado for twenty days during questioning, and forced to incriminate 
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themselves in order to secure the release of their illegally detained relatives.56  As 
late as 1997, the UN Special Rapporteur on torture issued a report and urged the 
government to bring provisions for incommunicado detention into line with the 
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention 
or Imprisonment.57  The issue of ill-treatment and torture in prisons was not fully 
and comprehensively addressed until 2005, when then-President Lagos 
organized the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture, 
Chile’s second truth commission whose mandate included the thousands of 
victims of torture and ill-treatment under the military government and 
throughout the political transition.  By the end of 2005, this commission collected 
almost 28,000 testimonies from victims of torture, though no measures were 
proposed for obtaining justice.58 
 
V. SOUTH AFRICA 
 
A. Context of the Formation of the South African Truth Commission 
 
 South Africa was a nondemocratic nation for the majority of the 20th 
century.  The roots of apartheid (the Dutch word for “separateness”) can be 
traced back to 1910, when the first South African constitution promulgated a 
                                                 
56 Human Rights Watch Annual Report, Chile, 1995. 
57 Amnesty International Annual Report, Chile, 1997. 
58 Amnesty International Annual Report, Chile, 2005. 
31 | P a g e  
 
structurally racist and undemocratic society.  This system was further solidified 
when the National Party (NP) came into power in 1948.  Under apartheid, a 
system that classified and discriminated people on the basis of skin color,  those 
classified as “non-whites”—well over the majority of the population—were 
denied basic political rights; they could not vote, run for office, or were not 
granted citizenship.  Furthermore, they were excluded in virtually all facets of 
everyday life, including housing, health services, education, and transportation.  
Apartheid, as defined by TRC commissioner Alex Boraine, was “a system of 
minority domination of statutorily defined color groups on a territorial, residential, 
political, social, and economic basis.”59 
 In response to the rigid apartheid system, the political party the African 
National Congress (ANC) launched a defiance campaign in 1952 in South 
Africa’s first mass civil disobedience campaign.60 In particular, the ANC was 
focused on how to combat the forced removals of blacks from Sophiatown, 
which the government had decided should be reserved for whites.61  In 1960, a 
breakaway group of the ANC, the militant Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) was 
banned after it organized a campaign against identity passes, in which 
unarmed protesters left their identity passes at home and gathered at police 
stations in order to be arrested for contravening the pass laws.  In this tragedy, 
known later as the Sharpeville Massacre, police opened fire, killing 69 people 
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and wounding 186 more.  The following year, the government banned both the 
ANC and the PAC, 62 and the leaders of the campaign (including Nelson 
Mandela) were sentenced to life imprisonment for inciting people to strike and 
for leaving the country without a passport.63  The TRC’s mandated period of 
investigation began its coverage at this point in South African history.  
 By the early 1990s, the country had suffered from massacres, killings, 
torture, lengthy imprisonment of activists, and severe economic and social 
discrimination against its majority non-white population.64  The negotiation 
process began in earnest in 1990, when Nelson Mandela was released from 
prison after National Party President F.W. de Klerk announced the unbanning a 
range of organizations and parties, including the ANC, the South African 
Communist Party, and the PAC.65  The same year, Nelson Mandela was freed 
from prison.  Within the next two years, Mandela was elected president in the 
country’s first free, all-race elections, and an interim government and 
constitution were established.  
After almost a century of deep racial and ideological divisions, violence, 
and social unrest, discussion of a truth commission to address the country’s 
history of human rights abuses began in 1994.  By 1995, the South African 
Parliament passed the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 
which established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), and the same 
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year, Archbishop Desmond Tutu was named head commissioner.  The 
commission’s mandate would demand an investigation of almost thirty-five 
years of human rights violations under apartheid.   
 
B. Assessment of the South African Truth Commission 
 
1. Formation stage 
 The establishment of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) in 1995 emerged out of almost two years of negotiations between the 
African National Congress (ANC), the National Party (NP), and over twenty-six 
other political parties in the country.  The formation of the truth commission was 
just one of many sweeping reforms and legislation that characterized South 
Africa’s revolutionary democratic transition.  The creation of the commission 
itself was a unique process; it was the first to be established by congressional 
legislation, distinguishing it from past truth commissions that were generally 
established by presidential decree.  The process began with two conferences, 
sponsored by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa and its Justice in 
Transition Project, held in Cape Town in 1994. At the conferences, delegates 
from Chile, Argentina, and Eastern Europe discussed their own experiences 
dealing with past abusive regimes.66  For nearly an entire year, the bill which 
proposed the commission, the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation 
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Act, was debated by multiple political parties in the Lower House and the 
Senate until it was finally signed into law on July 19, 1995 by South African 
president Nelson Mandela.   
 The mandate of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission addressed three 
tasks: 
(1) To compile as complete a record as possible of gross human 
rights violations during the period of March 21, 1960 to May 
10, 1994; 
(2)  To restore victims’ human and civil dignity by letting them tell 
their stories and to recommend how they could be assisted; 
(3) To consider granting amnesty to those perpetrators who 
carried out their abuses for political reasons and who gave 
full accountings of their actions to the commission.67 
 
The legislation defined human rights violations as the “killing, abduction, torture, 
or severe ill treatment of any person…which emanated from conflicts of the 
past…and the commission of which was advised, planned, directed, 
commanded or ordered by any person acting with a political motive.”68  On the 
one hand, the TRC’s mandate covered a substantial time period and its 
definition of human rights violations was notably broad.  However, it failed to 
address core practices of apartheid that created deep racial divisions in South 
African society for almost a century, including the forced removal and 
displacement of millions of people based on race and everyday policies and 
practices of apartheid.69 
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The TRC was unusual in the rigorous legal powers it was granted.  The 
commission had the power to subpoena witnesses and institutions, the power of 
search and seizure, and the power to grant amnesty to those perpetrators who 
provided full disclosure of their crimes and could establish that their actions were 
politically motivated.  Furthermore, the TRC had the power to make public the 
names of those it found to be perpetrators.  Together, these powers gave the 
TRC much broader access to documents and testimony that could more fully 
illustrate the events of the nearly thirty-five year period it was mandated to 
investigate.  As a result, agreements were made by political parties as well as by 
the military and security institutions to make public submissions to the 
commission.70 
To achieve its mandated goals, the TRC was structured into three 
separate committees: the Human Rights Committee, which conducted public 
hearings for victims and survivors; the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee, 
which was to develop policy for long-term reparations as well as interim relief; 
and the Amnesty Committee, which heard applications of amnesty through 
2000.71   
The commissioners were chosen by a similarly deliberative process.  
Nominees were suggested by NGOs, churches, and political parties and were 
interviewed in public by a selection panel, with the president and cabinet 
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choosing from a short list.72  In the end, Christian Archbishop Desmond Tutu was 
selected as head commissioner.  The remaining fourteen commissioners 
spanned the political spectrum and were racially diverse, with seven blacks, two 
Indians, and six whites.  Notably, while the majority of the commissioners came 
from the legal profession, four (including Tutu) were ordained ministers.73  
The staff and budget of the South African truth commission were also far 
and above past commissions in Africa and Latin America, with a staff of three 
hundred, a budget of some $18 million each year for two and a half years, and 
four large offices around the country.74  Additionally, its time of operation was 
lengthier than most: it worked 2.5 years at its peak, with an additional 3.5 years 
for the Amnesty Committee to complete its work (1995-2000).75 
 
2. Investigation stage 
 The TRC began its first hearings and investigations in April 1996.  The 
commission’s work was widely publicized in South African and international 
media because of its unique use of public hearings for victims and witnesses.  
The commission collected over 21,000 victim statements, 2,000 of which were 
public hearings.76  Their work covered an impressive but overwhelming 37,000 
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human rights violations under the commission’s mandate.77  The use of public 
hearings has been lauded by some and criticized by others.  On one hand, the 
public hearings offered a powerful and cathartic platform for victims and 
witnesses to publicly tell their stories about the trauma of the past, some for the 
first time.  The environment of reconciliation and forgiveness brought to the 
public hearings by Archbishop Tutu encouraged the healing of deep societal 
wounds and a new resolve to forgive and move the country forward.  On the 
other hand, public hearings were hard to administer, organize, and focus.78  
Additionally, there was a conspicuous absence of whites at any of the 
commission’s public hearings, a cause of concern to the commissioners and a 
valid reason to question the public hearings’ true potential to promote societal 
reconciliation.79  In addition to public hearings for individual victims and 
witnesses, a series of special hearings were held for institutions in society to 
account for their role in helping to legitimize or execute policies that furthered 
human rights violations during apartheid.  Testimonies were recorded from the 
business sector, the media, the health sector, and religious institutions.80 
 To complement witness and victim testimony, the Human Rights 
Committee did investigative research to corroborate its findings, and it utilized a 
wealth of expert information, forensic reports, and official documents to follow 
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up on details that were testified and to establish the nature and extent of 
violations.81  Certainly, the TRC’s subpoena and search and seizure powers 
aided it in its investigatory process.  However, it did not guarantee that all 
sources of information were available: one difficulty the commission 
experienced on this front were claims by the government upon request of 
information that critical official documents had either disappeared or were 
destroyed.82  Nevertheless, where the commission did gain access to official 
documents, the information would help the commission to more accurately 
understand and account for the causes and modus operandi of past human 
rights violations.  
 Special hearings for political parties were held, and testimony of key 
former officials, including former president F.W. de Klerk, were recorded during 
these hearings.  The ANC testified in general about the abuses committed by 
the National Party but less about its own abuses, and incredulously, the National 
Party and de Klerk denied authorizing planned murders, tortures, and 
assassinations.83  The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) additionally did not take 
responsibility for any acts of violence.  Neither former National Party presidents 
de Klerk and P.W. Botha nor IFP leader Mongosuthu Buthelezi applied for 
amnesty and remained unrepentant for the events of apartheid.  Tutu was 
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deeply disappointed that the perpetrators of these parties did not express 
remorse, regret, or apology to victims and their families.84  Botha was the only 
person to ignore his subpoena to testify at the commission’s hearings; he said he 
would refuse to be humiliated publicly and would not apologize for apartheid.  
In August 1998, Botha was found guilty of contempt for court, given a 
suspended jail sentence of one year, and fined $1,500.85 
 The Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation’s work involved 
collecting information that would help the government to design a system of 
reparations for victims.  It held regional hearings across the country in 1996 and 
1997 to find out what victims were seeking in terms of redress.  Its findings and 
recommendations for reparations were recorded in the commission’s final 
report.86 
Perhaps the most controversial dimension of the TRC’s investigation was 
the work of the Amnesty Committee.  Its work began in earnest in late 1996 and 
continued until 2000.  The committee received over 7,000 applications for 
amnesty.  The conditions for gaining amnesty were fourfold: (1) the crime must 
have occurred between 1960 and 1994; (2) the applicant must demonstrate the 
crime was politically motivated; (3) the applicant must provide full disclosure of 
the facts; and (4) the proportionality rule: the offence must have been carried 
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out in a manner in which it was proportionate to its objective.87  Ostensibly, the 
last criterion was the most ambiguous and controversial, and some of the most 
notorious and contested cases granted amnesty involved controversy over the 
“proportionality” rule.88   
The amnesty provision in general presented a dilemma for South Africans.  
The TRC was the first truth commission ever to utilize such a stipulation, and 
feelings were mixed about its value.  There is no doubt the work of the Amnesty 
Committee brought to light new information to the public about the abuses of 
the former regime.  However, the inherent moral question seems to be, “At what 
cost?”  Those who favored the amnesty power of the TRC believe it was a 
necessary political concession in order to bring the National Party on board with 
the truth-seeking process.  Those against it viewed it as a perpetrator-friendly 
body, indemnifying the guilty, completely surrendering justice in order to mollify 
whites, and ultimately damaging the commission’s goals of attaining improved 
reconciliation between members of society.89 
 
3. Report stage 
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section 1. 
88 Graybill (2002).   Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Miracle or Model?  70. 
89Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (2003).  Volume 6, chapter 5, 
section 1. See also Graybill (2002).   Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Miracle or Model?  
58. 
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 The final, five-volume report of the TRC was presented to President 
Mandela in October 1998.90  Its findings implicated over 400 individuals for 
committing human rights violations, and it recognized the responsibility of both 
the former state as well as the resistance.  The final report emphasized three 
major findings: (1) apartheid was a crime against humanity; (2) the previous 
government was responsible for most of the human rights violations between 
1960 and 1994; and (3) some resistance movements that fought to destroy 
apartheid were also guilty of gross human rights violations.91 
 The report itself was a comprehensive work of great breadth that 
examined all facets of South African society and the roles each of them played 
in assisting or ignoring heinous human rights violations, including torture, 
abduction, sever ill-treatment, deliberate manipulation of social divisions to 
mobilize one group against another, unjustified use of deadly force, arming and 
training foreign nationals, incursions across South Africa’s borders, judicial killings, 
extrajudicial killings, and covert training of hit squads.92  The first two volumes of 
the report explained in detail the structure of the commission, its investigative 
procedures, and a comprehensive historical context from 1960 to 1994.  The 
third volume illustrated profiles of regions in South Africa most directly affected 
by past abuses; the fourth contained the findings of the institutional hearings.  
                                                 
90 A sixth volume with the Amnesty Committee’s final report, and a seventh volume summarizing 
victim findings, were released in 2001. 
91 Human Rights Watch Annual Report, South Africa, 1999.  See also Graybill (2002).   Truth and 
Reconciliation in South Africa: Miracle or Model?  145. 
92 Graybill (2002).   Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Miracle or Model?  145. 
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Finally, the fifth volume reported the commission’s findings and 
recommendations.   
 In this final section, the commission stressed that those recommendations 
listed should serve the grander, ultimate goal of societal reconciliation.  In order 
to ensure the prevention of human rights in the future, the report laid out a series 
of “simultaneous actions” that needed to take place in South Africa that would 
establish a culture of human rights; this list included a wide dissemination of the 
commission’s findings, transforming the educational system, closing the gap 
between rich and poor through increased availability of social services, 
combating racism, and the complete elimination of human rights violations by 
the police and security forces in the country.93  It also recommended that a 
follow-up body be set up to administer financial reparations to victims and 
oversee the implementation of its recommendations, quite similar to Chile.  
 The addition of the Amnesty Committee’s report as volume six in 2001 
contributed new, previously unknown information about the past as well as a 
detailed explanation of the committee’s procedures.  This particular section of 
the overall report helped further the commission’s mandated goal to develop as 
complete a picture as possible of human rights violations between 1960 and 
1994.  A seventh volume added the same year gave a summary of victims’ 
findings.  
                                                 
93 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (1998).  Volume 5, chapter 8, 309.  
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 Perhaps what was most notable about the TRC’s final report was the 
impartiality with which the commission approached assigning guilt to various 
parties of apartheid-era South Africa.94  Although the National Party was 
burdened with the most blame by the commission as well as the Inkatha 
Freedom Party, which collaborated with the former government in hit-squad 
activity, it equally accused the African National Congress, the main resistance 
movement, of gross human rights violations.  The report found that the ANC was 
guilty of committing civilian casualties during its own acts of resistance.  Similarly, 
the Pan-Africanist Congress was reproached for engaging in acts of war by 
killing white farmers.95  As a result of its special hearings for various sectors of 
society, the TRC’s report even placed blame on institutions like the United Dutch 
Reformed Church, finding that the Church promoted the ideology of 
apartheid.96  As Desmond Tutu said, “A gross violation is a gross violation, 
whoever commits it and for whatever reason.”97  However, the fact that all sides 
of the conflict were incriminated inflamed actors across the political spectrum 
and would make it more difficult to achieve reconciliation.  
 
4.  Acknowledgment stage 
                                                 
94 However, some have considered the report’s impartiality as proof that the commission was 
confined by the chains of political compromise. 
95 Graybill (2002).   Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Miracle or Model?  145-148. 
96 Deegan (2001).  The Politics of the New South Africa: Apartheid and After.  152. 
97 Graybill (2002).   Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Miracle or Model?  147. 
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 The TRC’s final report was released in October 1998 with a flurry of 
controversy arising in the days prior to the release.  As expected, the report was 
boycotted by the National Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party, the two parties 
most criticized in the report.  Even the African National Congress, the party 
responsible for creating the commission, condemned the report’s findings as 
criminalizing the anti-apartheid movement.98  Both former NP president F.W. de 
Klerk and the ANC challenged the report in court; de Klerk was successful in 
removing a short section which named him as a perpetrator of abuses.99   
President Mandela, however, made an effort to distance himself from 
those opposing the report and at the ceremony in which the commission 
presented to the report to him, he expressed his approval of the commission’s 
activities.100  Additionally, Tutu acknowledged that while many were unhappy 
with the content of the report, it shed light on crucial events of the past that 
would help South Africa move forward and learn from apartheid.101  However, 
the government made no commitment to implement the commission’s many 
recommendations in the day immediately following the release of the report.102  
While some recommendations would be pursued in the coming years, not until 
the Amnesty Committee completed its work in 2000 did the commission’s legacy 
                                                 
98 Graybill (2002).   Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Miracle or Model?  148. 
99 Human Rights Watch Annual Report, South Africa, 2000. 
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come under increased scrutiny, especially in the delayed execution of its 
recommended reparations to victims. 
 Public reaction to the commission’s report was not overly enthusiastic.  A 
national poll released by Market Research Africa just as the report was about to 
be released revealed that nearly two-thirds of the public believed that 
revelations resulting from the truth commission process had made South Africans 
angrier and led to a deterioration in relations between races.103  While the TRC’s 
report came under fire, Quinn and Freeman suggest that this was because the 
public felt other aspects of the truth commission’s process, such as its public 
hearings, were more effective than the release of the report.104 
 Response to the report was also divided along racial lines.  A national poll 
in 1998 addressing the future consequences of the TRC asked “Having the 
Commission means that all people in South Africa will be able to live together 
more easily in the future.  Do you agree or disagree?”  54.2% of black 
respondents agreed, compared to only 20% of white respondents; 69.3% white 
respondents disagreed, compared to 20.6% of black respondents.105  
Additionally, in a July 2000 survey, only half of white South African respondents 
felt that it was their “responsibility as a citizen to contribute to the process of 
national reconciliation.”106 
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 Those who criticized the commission felt that it did not fully capture the 
motives and perspectives of those who perpetrated gross human rights 
violations.  The commission defended itself by claiming that its primary function 
was not to write the political history of South Africa, but to expose violations of all 
parties as a means of laying the basis for a human rights culture in the country.107  
Others were angered by the commission’s ongoing amnesty process and 
viewed it as a concession to placate perpetrators; in addition, the amnesty 
process brought to light new information that was released in the official report 
that quite simply disturbed and upset many people in South African society.108  
Those who supported the commission’s work lauded it as an excellent example 
of an “even-handed” search for truth that was impressively comprehensive in 
scope for the amount of time it operated.109  Others see the vigorous debate 
and heated emotions from all sides after the release of the report as a testimony 
to the commission’s credibility.110 It is fair to say that South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was a courageous and unorthodox experiment in 
addressing past human rights violations. Yet, in order to fully realize whether the 
commission’s work furthered justice or reconciliation, it is necessary to engage in 
an in-depth assessment of how fully its major recommended reforms were 
advocated and implemented by the government.    
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C. Key Recommendations of the South African Truth Commission 
 
1. Reparations:  Individual reparation grants paid over a period of six years 
should be given to each victim of a human rights violation.  Partially 
implemented.   
In its official report released in 1998, the TRC made firm suggestions that 
reparation and rehabilitation policies should immediately and comprehensively 
address the psychological, physical, and spiritual needs of victims of human 
rights violations.  Specifically, it outlined a an individual reparations grant 
program in which an amount of money be made available to a victim or his or 
her families for three purposes: (1) to acknowledge the suffering of the victim, (2) 
to enable access to facilities and services, and (3) to subsidize daily living 
costs.111  The grant would be administered by a President’s Fund and would cost 
approximately 3 billion rand ($420 million).112 
By June 2000, $4.2 million had been paid out to 10,000 victims, but 
thousands more had still not received reparations two years after the 
commission’s final report.  The delayed of deliverance these individual grants to 
thousands of victims as well as their total absence for thousands more continues 
today to taint the perception of the TRC’s work in South Africa.  While Mbeki 
government promised in 2002 that it would introduce legislation to outline a 
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comprehensive reparations policy, in 2003, Human Rights Watch wrote President 
Mbeki expressing concern that 22,000 victims and/or family members still had 
not received reparation payments.113  On April 15, 2003, Mbeki authorized a 
one-time payment of $74 million to victims in “urgent” need—almost $300 million 
less than the recommended amount by the commission. He also spoke against 
numerous U.S. class action lawsuits against South African corporations whose 
practices contributed to apartheid.114 
 While the TRC’s recommendations for reparations have still not been fully 
administered to this day, Tom Lodge notes that this is hardly the fault of the TRC, 
but rather that of the government.  He puts forth several explanations for why 
reparations have not been delivered.  First, logistical difficulties prevented a 
quick and efficient distribution of money from the President’s Fund to victims; for 
example, although in 1998 the government authorized urgent interim payments, 
by 2000, much of the money in the Fund remained there because of 
uncertainties of which government department was responsible for distributing 
the money.  Additionally, the government seemed to delay action on 
reparations simply because government officials viewed reparations as a low-
priority concern.  Lodge believes both the lack of official enthusiasm was unlikely 
fiscal austerity but rather a result of political hostility to the commission’s work.  
Lodge explains that a fundamental difference existed between the government 
                                                 
113 Human Rights Watch Annual Report, South Africa, 2003. 
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ANC officials (such as Mandela) and those ANC members who applied for 
amnesty through the commission: the former were in favor of a more general 
amnesty and a fresh start, while the latter argued that white South Africans 
should finance reparations.115   The government’s unspoken disagreement with 
the commission’s proposal to have reparations paid out as a means of attaining 
justice and reconciliation resulted in sluggish, disorganized implementation.  
Regardless of the political conflict over the issue of reparations, the lack of 
fulfillment of the TRC’s recommendation in this area left huge sectors of society 
deeply frustrated that their suffering had not been acknowledged through 
individual grants and incredulous of the actual reconciliatory value of the 
commission. 
 
2. The Rule of Law:  Where amnesty has not been sought or has been 
denied, prosecution should be considered where evidence exists that an 
individual has committed a gross human rights violation.  Not implemented. 
 The TRC prioritized in its recommendations the need to bring to justice 
those perpetrators it found to be guilty of human rights abuses.  In its 
recommendation section addressing accountability, the first recommendation 
listed suggested prosecution of those who were denied amnesty or did not seek 
it but were found to have committed gross human rights violations. The 
commission articulated that it would aid this process by making “available to 
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the appropriate authorities information in its possession concerning serious 
allegations against individuals.”116 It makes note afterwards that no general 
amnesty should be granted, at the risk of establishing a culture of impunity.   
 This recommendation was glaringly disregarded by President Mbeki in 
May 2002, when he pardoned thirty-three convicted prisoners, primarily from the 
ANC and Pan-Africanist Congress, even though some of them had been denied 
amnesty by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  Other parties protested 
the pardons or demanded similar treatment for their own members.  Human 
Rights Watch wrote Mbeki the same year to condemn the pardons as well as 
Mbeki’s proposal that a further amnesty for apartheid-era politically motivated 
crimes be granted.117  The government continued to largely ignore the TRC’s 
recommendations for prosecution as it did the recommendations for 
reparation.118 
 Mbeki’s pardoning of the prisoners, a manifestly biased act as well as an 
act of politically expediency, undermined the even-handed findings of 
commission.  Here again, responsibility for this recommendation’s failure may not 
be fully placed on the commission but rather on how the government 
responded to and implemented truth commission recommendations.  In 
selectively pardoning prisoners of his own party, Mbeki not only acted in a way 
that eroded the rule of law of the new South Africa, but he also effectively 
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undermined the comprehensive work and legal powers of the TRC.  It had been 
one of the first with the power to both publicly name the names of perpetrators 
and to recommend prosecutions after it completed its findings.  The failure of 
the government to capitalize and contribute to justice with the resources and 
information provided by the TRC again reflected a fundamental difference and 
division between the TRC and the government’s respective conceptions on how 
to achieve post-conflict justice.  
 
3. Human Rights:  Prison officers should receive human rights training as a 
basic guide for treatment of prisoners and the management of the prison 
systems.  Implemented. 
   The TRC placed special emphasis on transforming the South African 
prison system in its recommendations.  It found that the existing institutional 
prison structure and the practices of prison officials were derived from the 
entrenched legacy of human rights violations rather than from the norms of 
prison law, human rights law, and the Constitution.119  In one of its key 
recommendations in this area, the TRC proposed that prison officers receive 
human rights training as a basic guide for treatment of prisoners and the 
management of prison systems.120 
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 Even after South Africa democratized, conditions in South African prisons 
remained dismal.  In addition to overcrowding, numerous instances of 
disturbance, unrest, and prison violence were reported.121  In 1995, there were 
also reports of violence between prisoners as well as by guards assaulting 
prisoners.122  Although in 1995 the Correctional Services Transformation Forum 
was held to discuss prison reform and the prison service was officially 
demilitarized in 1997, little progress was made in addressing human rights 
violations that continued in prisons.123 
 It was not until 1998 that major prison reform legislation and programs to 
train prison guards emerged, the same year that the recommendations of the 
TRC were made public.  A pilot project for training prisoners and prison staff in 
human rights norms was launched in 1998 by the Department of Correctional 
Services together with two nongovernmental organizations.  In addition, that fall 
the government introduced important legislation designed to restructure the 
prison service.124  Similar progress was made in 2000, when President Mbeki 
appointed Judge Johannes Fagan to head a judicial inspectorate to provide 
independent oversight of prison conditions in the country.125 
 Perhaps the most notable implementation of the commission’s 
recommendation was the passing into law of the Correctional Services Act 111 
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of 1998.  This comprehensive bill, which established the Judicial Inspectorate 
among other codes of conduct for prisons, addressed “the custody of all 
prisoners under conditions of human dignity.”  The bill outlined codes of conduct 
for safe custody of prisoners, access to healthcare and services, and the training 
of prison officials in creating an environment that respects the human dignity of 
the imprisoned.126  The sections of the bill began to be actively enforced in 2004. 
Though overcrowding continued in South African prisons into 2005, the passing 
of the Correctional Services Act 111 enabled noticeable progress to be made in 
the area of human rights of prisoners.127 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
 This research project originally assumed Chile’s National Commission for 
Truth and Reconciliation was a categorically failed truth commission, while South 
Africa’s TRC was a model of success.  In engaging in a four-stage assessment of 
each commission’s work, as well as examining whether key recommendations in 
the areas of reparations, the rule of law, and human rights were implemented in 
both countries, we were surprised to discover mixed results.   
Indeed, Chile did face tough obstacles in its search for truth: the outgoing 
military regime still controlled most facets of the government after the transition; 
the commission did not possess the necessary legal powers to compel witnesses 
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and perpetrators to testify; and cases of human rights violations did not move 
forward in the courts until almost a decade after the commission’s work 
completed.  In addition (and perhaps because of) these limitations, the 
commission did not have the courage to recommend the annulment of the 
1978 Amnesty Law or to more boldly demand acknowledgement of human 
rights abuses from the military and secret police.  However, in Chile, we found 
successes that need to be credited.  For example, Chile’s truth commission was 
the first to recommend and then successfully implement a follow-up body to 
continue investigations as well as deliver reparations to victims it established in its 
report.  Furthermore, as one of the first major truth commissions in Latin America, 
the Chilean truth commission’s final report was impressively comprehensive in 
the detail it afforded to each victim’s story and in the depth it devoted to 
understanding the context of Pinochet’s oppressive regime. 
 Likewise, in studying South Africa, our initial preconceptions about the 
commission were soon qualified by the evidence gathered in our research.  
Both in popular media and a substantial amount of scholarship on the subject, 
South Africa is portrayed as the model of success for truth commissions.  This 
portrayal is not entirely false.  The TRC was unprecedented on many levels.  It 
was the first truth commission in the world with the power to grant amnesty to 
perpetrators for their full disclosure in the truth-seeking process, a radically new 
approach to post-conflict justice.  Its introduction of public hearings in its 
investigations also allowed victims’ stories to be shared with a large national 
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audience and attracted wide interest from the international community.  In 
addition, the TRC was the largest, most funded, and longest operating truth 
commission, with a broad scope of violations as well as over thirty-four years of 
apartheid to investigate.  However, the South African TRC was by no means 
perfect in either performing its duties or achieving its goals.  It failed to 
investigate the basic discriminatory practices of apartheid that divided and 
oppressed black South Africans for almost a century.  Furthermore, the 
conspicuous absence of white South Africans in the commission’s search for 
truth undermined the TRC’s grander goal of reconciliation.  And the 
government’s blatant disregard for the commission’s recommendations to 
administer reparations to victims as well as the pardoning of its own speaks 
poorly for the TRC’s power in South African politics and even worse for victims’ 
needs.   
 Numerous questions remaining as a result of comparing Chile and South 
Africa can fuel future research.  For example, what factors can help a truth 
commission more fully investigate its mandate?  Decisions made in the formation 
stage are critical in determining the answer to this questions; for example, in 
Chile, legal powers of subpoena and search and seizure could only have been 
granted to the commission if it was vested with authority by congressional 
legislation.  Furthermore, how can the existing political climate predict and 
affect the quality and breadth of the commission’s search for truth?  In South 
Africa, the TRC emerged in a period directly following political negotiations 
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between a number of parties on the political spectrum, and this most likely set 
the stage for the TRC’s comprehensive investigations, which assigned blame on 
both the former state and opposition parties.  Finally, how can a truth 
commission ensure that its recommendations are fully implemented after it 
completes its work?  Chile was successful at creating a follow-up body, while a 
similar recommendation in South Africa was disregarded by the government.   
 In the end, neither Chile’s National Commission for Truth and 
Reconciliation nor South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission can be 
categorically defined as a “success” or a “failure.”  As a relatively recent 
phenomenon, truth commissions as transitional justice mechanisms are 
continually evolving, and the optimal and most effective way for them to 
perform in the context of political transitions is still being discovered.  The 
strengths and weaknesses of both Chile and South Africa’s experiences with 
truth commissions can guide and teach critical lessons to nations considering 
the truth-seeking process as an aid in their democratic transitions.   It is with hope 
that comparative research of these country experiences highlights those 
conditions, factors, and decisions that do the most to further justice and 
reconciliation in the aftermath of abusive regimes.   
  
Bibliography 
 
Amnesty International Annual Reports, Chile, 1990 – 2008.  
 
Boraine, Alex (2000).  “Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: the Third Way.”  Truth v. Justice: the 
 
 Morality of Truth Commissions.   
 
Deegan, Heather (2001).  The Politics of the New South Africa: Apartheid and After.   
 
Eades, Lindsay (1999).  The End of Apartheid in South Africa. 
 
Ensalaco, Mark (2000).  Chile Under Pinochet: Recovering the Truth. 
 
Graybill, Heather (2002).   Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Miracle or Model?   
 
Hayner, Priscilla (1994).  “Fifteen Truth Commissions—1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study.”  Human  
 
Rights Quarterly.   
 
Hayner, Priscilla (2001). Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity. 
 
Human Rights Watch Annual Reports, Chile, 1990 ‐ 2008. 
 
Human Rights Watch Annual Reports, South Africa, 1994 – 2008. 
 
Kirtz, Neal, ed. (1995).  Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes.   
 
Volume II: Country Studies.   
 
Lodge, Tom (2002).  Politics in South Africa: From Mandela to Mbeki. 
 
Quinn and Freeman (2003).  “Lessons Learned: Practical Lessons Gleaned from the Inside the Truth  
 
Commissions of Guatemala and South Africa.”  Human Rights Quarterly.   
 
Rodio, Emily (2007).  “Settling Past Accounts: Assessing the Impact of Truth Commissions on  
 
Democratization.”  Paper presented at International Studies Association, 2007.   
 
Skaar, Elin (1999).  “Truth commissions, trials—or nothing? Policy options in democratic transitions.”   
 
Third World Quarterly.   
 
The Report of the Chilean National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (1994). 
 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (1998). 
